379 lines
13 KiB
Python
379 lines
13 KiB
Python
# ===================================================================
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#
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# Copyright (c) 2014, Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com>
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# All rights reserved.
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#
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# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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# are met:
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#
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# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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# the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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# distribution.
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#
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# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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# "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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# LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
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# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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# COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
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# BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
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# CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
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# ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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# ===================================================================
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"""
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EAX mode.
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"""
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__all__ = ['EaxMode']
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from Crypto.Util.py3compat import byte_string, bchr, bord, unhexlify, b
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from Crypto.Util.strxor import strxor
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from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long
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from Crypto.Hash import CMAC, BLAKE2s
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from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
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class EaxMode(object):
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"""*EAX* mode.
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This is an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
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(`AEAD`_) mode. It provides both confidentiality and authenticity.
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The header of the message may be left in the clear, if needed,
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and it will still be subject to authentication.
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The decryption step tells the receiver if the message comes
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from a source that really knowns the secret key.
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Additionally, decryption detects if any part of the message -
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including the header - has been modified or corrupted.
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This mode requires a *nonce*.
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This mode is only available for ciphers that operate on 64 or
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128 bits blocks.
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There are no official standards defining EAX.
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The implementation is based on `a proposal`__ that
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was presented to NIST.
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.. _AEAD: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/05/how-to-choose-authenticated-encryption.html
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.. __: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/eax/eax-spec.pdf
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:undocumented: __init__
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"""
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def __init__(self, factory, key, nonce, mac_len, cipher_params):
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"""EAX cipher mode"""
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self.block_size = factory.block_size
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"""The block size of the underlying cipher, in bytes."""
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self.nonce = nonce
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"""The nonce originally used to create the object."""
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self._mac_len = mac_len
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self._mac_tag = None # Cache for MAC tag
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# Allowed transitions after initialization
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self._next = [self.update, self.encrypt, self.decrypt,
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self.digest, self.verify]
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# MAC tag length
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if not (4 <= self._mac_len <= self.block_size):
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raise ValueError("Parameter 'mac_len' must not be larger than %d"
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% self.block_size)
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# Nonce cannot be empty and must be a byte string
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if len(nonce) == 0:
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raise ValueError("Nonce cannot be empty in EAX mode")
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if not byte_string(nonce):
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raise TypeError("Nonce must be a byte string")
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self._omac = [
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CMAC.new(key,
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bchr(0) * (self.block_size - 1) + bchr(i),
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ciphermod=factory,
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cipher_params=cipher_params)
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for i in range(0, 3)
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]
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# Compute MAC of nonce
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self._omac[0].update(nonce)
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self._signer = self._omac[1]
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# MAC of the nonce is also the initial counter for CTR encryption
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counter_int = bytes_to_long(self._omac[0].digest())
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self._cipher = factory.new(key,
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factory.MODE_CTR,
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initial_value=counter_int,
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nonce=b(""),
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**cipher_params)
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def update(self, assoc_data):
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"""Protect associated data
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If there is any associated data, the caller has to invoke
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this function one or more times, before using
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``decrypt`` or ``encrypt``.
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By *associated data* it is meant any data (e.g. packet headers) that
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will not be encrypted and will be transmitted in the clear.
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However, the receiver is still able to detect any modification to it.
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If there is no associated data, this method must not be called.
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The caller may split associated data in segments of any size, and
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invoke this method multiple times, each time with the next segment.
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:Parameters:
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assoc_data : byte string
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A piece of associated data. There are no restrictions on its size.
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"""
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if self.update not in self._next:
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raise TypeError("update() can only be called"
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" immediately after initialization")
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self._next = [self.update, self.encrypt, self.decrypt,
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self.digest, self.verify]
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return self._signer.update(assoc_data)
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def encrypt(self, plaintext):
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"""Encrypt data with the key and the parameters set at initialization.
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A cipher object is stateful: once you have encrypted a message
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you cannot encrypt (or decrypt) another message using the same
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object.
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The data to encrypt can be broken up in two or
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more pieces and `encrypt` can be called multiple times.
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That is, the statement:
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>>> c.encrypt(a) + c.encrypt(b)
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is equivalent to:
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>>> c.encrypt(a+b)
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This function does not add any padding to the plaintext.
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:Parameters:
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plaintext : byte string
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The piece of data to encrypt.
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It can be of any length.
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:Return:
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the encrypted data, as a byte string.
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It is as long as *plaintext*.
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"""
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if self.encrypt not in self._next:
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raise TypeError("encrypt() can only be called after"
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" initialization or an update()")
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self._next = [self.encrypt, self.digest]
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ct = self._cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
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self._omac[2].update(ct)
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return ct
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def decrypt(self, ciphertext):
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"""Decrypt data with the key and the parameters set at initialization.
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A cipher object is stateful: once you have decrypted a message
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you cannot decrypt (or encrypt) another message with the same
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object.
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The data to decrypt can be broken up in two or
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more pieces and `decrypt` can be called multiple times.
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That is, the statement:
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>>> c.decrypt(a) + c.decrypt(b)
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is equivalent to:
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>>> c.decrypt(a+b)
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This function does not remove any padding from the plaintext.
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:Parameters:
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ciphertext : byte string
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The piece of data to decrypt.
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It can be of any length.
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:Return: the decrypted data (byte string).
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"""
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if self.decrypt not in self._next:
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raise TypeError("decrypt() can only be called"
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" after initialization or an update()")
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self._next = [self.decrypt, self.verify]
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self._omac[2].update(ciphertext)
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return self._cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
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def digest(self):
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"""Compute the *binary* MAC tag.
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The caller invokes this function at the very end.
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This method returns the MAC that shall be sent to the receiver,
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together with the ciphertext.
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:Return: the MAC, as a byte string.
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"""
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if self.digest not in self._next:
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raise TypeError("digest() cannot be called when decrypting"
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" or validating a message")
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self._next = [self.digest]
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if not self._mac_tag:
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tag = bchr(0) * self.block_size
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for i in range(3):
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tag = strxor(tag, self._omac[i].digest())
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self._mac_tag = tag[:self._mac_len]
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return self._mac_tag
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def hexdigest(self):
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"""Compute the *printable* MAC tag.
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This method is like `digest`.
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:Return: the MAC, as a hexadecimal string.
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"""
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return "".join(["%02x" % bord(x) for x in self.digest()])
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def verify(self, received_mac_tag):
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"""Validate the *binary* MAC tag.
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The caller invokes this function at the very end.
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This method checks if the decrypted message is indeed valid
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(that is, if the key is correct) and it has not been
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tampered with while in transit.
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:Parameters:
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received_mac_tag : byte string
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This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender.
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:Raises MacMismatchError:
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if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with
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or the key is incorrect.
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"""
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if self.verify not in self._next:
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raise TypeError("verify() cannot be called"
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" when encrypting a message")
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self._next = [self.verify]
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if not self._mac_tag:
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tag = bchr(0) * self.block_size
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for i in range(3):
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tag = strxor(tag, self._omac[i].digest())
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self._mac_tag = tag[:self._mac_len]
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secret = get_random_bytes(16)
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mac1 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=self._mac_tag)
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mac2 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=received_mac_tag)
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if mac1.digest() != mac2.digest():
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raise ValueError("MAC check failed")
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def hexverify(self, hex_mac_tag):
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"""Validate the *printable* MAC tag.
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This method is like `verify`.
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:Parameters:
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hex_mac_tag : string
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This is the *printable* MAC, as received from the sender.
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:Raises MacMismatchError:
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if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with
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or the key is incorrect.
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"""
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self.verify(unhexlify(hex_mac_tag))
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def encrypt_and_digest(self, plaintext):
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"""Perform encrypt() and digest() in one step.
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:Parameters:
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plaintext : byte string
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The piece of data to encrypt.
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:Return:
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a tuple with two byte strings:
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- the encrypted data
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- the MAC
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"""
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return self.encrypt(plaintext), self.digest()
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def decrypt_and_verify(self, ciphertext, received_mac_tag):
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"""Perform decrypt() and verify() in one step.
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:Parameters:
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ciphertext : byte string
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The piece of data to decrypt.
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received_mac_tag : byte string
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This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender.
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:Return: the decrypted data (byte string).
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:Raises MacMismatchError:
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if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with
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or the key is incorrect.
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"""
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pt = self.decrypt(ciphertext)
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self.verify(received_mac_tag)
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return pt
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def _create_eax_cipher(factory, **kwargs):
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"""Create a new block cipher, configured in EAX mode.
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:Parameters:
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factory : module
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A symmetric cipher module from `Crypto.Cipher` (like
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`Crypto.Cipher.AES`).
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:Keywords:
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key : byte string
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The secret key to use in the symmetric cipher.
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nonce : byte string
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A value that must never be reused for any other encryption.
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There are no restrictions on its length, but it is recommended to use
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at least 16 bytes.
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The nonce shall never repeat for two different messages encrypted with
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the same key, but it does not need to be random.
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If not specified, a 16 byte long random string is used.
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mac_len : integer
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Length of the MAC, in bytes. It must be no larger than the cipher
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block bytes (which is the default).
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"""
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try:
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key = kwargs.pop("key")
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nonce = kwargs.pop("nonce", None)
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if nonce is None:
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nonce = get_random_bytes(16)
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mac_len = kwargs.pop("mac_len", factory.block_size)
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except KeyError as e:
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raise TypeError("Missing parameter: " + str(e))
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return EaxMode(factory, key, nonce, mac_len, kwargs)
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