Added delete option to database storage.

venv/Lib/site-packages/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/__init__.py

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+import sys
+
+try:
+    # Our match_hostname function is the same as 3.5's, so we only want to
+    # import the match_hostname function if it's at least that good.
+    if sys.version_info < (3, 5):
+        raise ImportError("Fallback to vendored code")
+
+    from ssl import CertificateError, match_hostname
+except ImportError:
+    try:
+        # Backport of the function from a pypi module
+        from backports.ssl_match_hostname import CertificateError, match_hostname
+    except ImportError:
+        # Our vendored copy
+        from ._implementation import CertificateError, match_hostname
+
+# Not needed, but documenting what we provide.
+__all__ = ("CertificateError", "match_hostname")

venv/Lib/site-packages/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/_implementation.py

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+"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.3.3, essential when using SSL."""
+
+# Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python
+# stdlib.   http://docs.python.org/3/license.html
+
+import re
+import sys
+
+# ipaddress has been backported to 2.6+ in pypi.  If it is installed on the
+# system, use it to handle IPAddress ServerAltnames (this was added in
+# python-3.5) otherwise only do DNS matching.  This allows
+# backports.ssl_match_hostname to continue to be used in Python 2.7.
+try:
+    import ipaddress
+except ImportError:
+    ipaddress = None
+
+__version__ = "3.5.0.1"
+
+
+class CertificateError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
+    """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
+
+    http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
+    """
+    pats = []
+    if not dn:
+        return False
+
+    # Ported from python3-syntax:
+    # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
+    parts = dn.split(r".")
+    leftmost = parts[0]
+    remainder = parts[1:]
+
+    wildcards = leftmost.count("*")
+    if wildcards > max_wildcards:
+        # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
+        # than one wildcard per fragment.  A survey of established
+        # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
+        # reasonable choice.
+        raise CertificateError(
+            "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn)
+        )
+
+    # speed up common case w/o wildcards
+    if not wildcards:
+        return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
+
+    # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
+    # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
+    # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
+    if leftmost == "*":
+        # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
+        # fragment.
+        pats.append("[^.]+")
+    elif leftmost.startswith("xn--") or hostname.startswith("xn--"):
+        # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
+        # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
+        # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
+        # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
+        pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
+    else:
+        # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
+        pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r"\*", "[^.]*"))
+
+    # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
+    for frag in remainder:
+        pats.append(re.escape(frag))
+
+    pat = re.compile(r"\A" + r"\.".join(pats) + r"\Z", re.IGNORECASE)
+    return pat.match(hostname)
+
+
+def _to_unicode(obj):
+    if isinstance(obj, str) and sys.version_info < (3,):
+        obj = unicode(obj, encoding="ascii", errors="strict")
+    return obj
+
+
+def _ipaddress_match(ipname, host_ip):
+    """Exact matching of IP addresses.
+
+    RFC 6125 explicitly doesn't define an algorithm for this
+    (section 1.7.2 - "Out of Scope").
+    """
+    # OpenSSL may add a trailing newline to a subjectAltName's IP address
+    # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
+    ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(ipname).rstrip())
+    return ip == host_ip
+
+
+def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
+    """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
+    SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*.  RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
+    rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
+
+    CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
+    returns nothing.
+    """
+    if not cert:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a "
+            "SSL socket or SSL context with either "
+            "CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED"
+        )
+    try:
+        # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
+        host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(hostname))
+    except ValueError:
+        # Not an IP address (common case)
+        host_ip = None
+    except UnicodeError:
+        # Divergence from upstream: Have to deal with ipaddress not taking
+        # byte strings.  addresses should be all ascii, so we consider it not
+        # an ipaddress in this case
+        host_ip = None
+    except AttributeError:
+        # Divergence from upstream: Make ipaddress library optional
+        if ipaddress is None:
+            host_ip = None
+        else:
+            raise
+    dnsnames = []
+    san = cert.get("subjectAltName", ())
+    for key, value in san:
+        if key == "DNS":
+            if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+                return
+            dnsnames.append(value)
+        elif key == "IP Address":
+            if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip):
+                return
+            dnsnames.append(value)
+    if not dnsnames:
+        # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
+        # in subjectAltName
+        for sub in cert.get("subject", ()):
+            for key, value in sub:
+                # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
+                # must be used.
+                if key == "commonName":
+                    if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+                        return
+                    dnsnames.append(value)
+    if len(dnsnames) > 1:
+        raise CertificateError(
+            "hostname %r "
+            "doesn't match either of %s" % (hostname, ", ".join(map(repr, dnsnames)))
+        )
+    elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
+        raise CertificateError("hostname %r doesn't match %r" % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
+    else:
+        raise CertificateError(
+            "no appropriate commonName or subjectAltName fields were found"
+        )