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node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/checkpoint.d.ts

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+import { TLogAuthority } from '../trust';
+import type { TLogEntryWithInclusionProof } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+export declare function verifyCheckpoint(entry: TLogEntryWithInclusionProof, tlogs: TLogAuthority[]): void;

node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/checkpoint.js

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+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyCheckpoint = void 0;
+/*
+Copyright 2023 The Sigstore Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+const core_1 = require("@sigstore/core");
+const error_1 = require("../error");
+const trust_1 = require("../trust");
+// Separator between the note and the signatures in a checkpoint
+const CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR = '\n\n';
+// Checkpoint signatures are of the following form:
+// "– <identity> <key_hint+signature_bytes>\n"
+// where:
+// - the prefix is an emdash (U+2014).
+// - <identity> gives a human-readable representation of the signing ID.
+// - <key_hint+signature_bytes> is the first 4 bytes of the SHA256 hash of the
+//   associated public key followed by the signature bytes.
+const SIGNATURE_REGEX = /\u2014 (\S+) (\S+)\n/g;
+// Verifies the checkpoint value in the given tlog entry. There are two steps
+// to the verification:
+// 1. Verify that all signatures in the checkpoint can be verified against a
+//    trusted public key
+// 2. Verify that the root hash in the checkpoint matches the root hash in the
+//    inclusion proof
+// See: https://github.com/transparency-dev/formats/blob/main/log/README.md
+function verifyCheckpoint(entry, tlogs) {
+    // Filter tlog instances to just those which were valid at the time of the
+    // entry
+    const validTLogs = (0, trust_1.filterTLogAuthorities)(tlogs, {
+        targetDate: new Date(Number(entry.integratedTime) * 1000),
+    });
+    const inclusionProof = entry.inclusionProof;
+    const signedNote = SignedNote.fromString(inclusionProof.checkpoint.envelope);
+    const checkpoint = LogCheckpoint.fromString(signedNote.note);
+    // Verify that the signatures in the checkpoint are all valid
+    if (!verifySignedNote(signedNote, validTLogs)) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+            message: 'invalid checkpoint signature',
+        });
+    }
+    // Verify that the root hash from the checkpoint matches the root hash in the
+    // inclusion proof
+    if (!core_1.crypto.bufferEqual(checkpoint.logHash, inclusionProof.rootHash)) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+            message: 'root hash mismatch',
+        });
+    }
+}
+exports.verifyCheckpoint = verifyCheckpoint;
+// Verifies the signatures in the SignedNote. For each signature, the
+// corresponding transparency log is looked up by the key hint and the
+// signature is verified against the public key in the transparency log.
+// Throws an error if any of the signatures are invalid.
+function verifySignedNote(signedNote, tlogs) {
+    const data = Buffer.from(signedNote.note, 'utf-8');
+    return signedNote.signatures.every((signature) => {
+        // Find the transparency log instance with the matching key hint
+        const tlog = tlogs.find((tlog) => core_1.crypto.bufferEqual(tlog.logID.subarray(0, 4), signature.keyHint));
+        if (!tlog) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        return core_1.crypto.verify(data, tlog.publicKey, signature.signature);
+    });
+}
+// SignedNote represents a signed note from a transparency log checkpoint. Consists
+// of a body (or note) and one more signatures calculated over the body. See
+// https://github.com/transparency-dev/formats/blob/main/log/README.md#signed-envelope
+class SignedNote {
+    constructor(note, signatures) {
+        this.note = note;
+        this.signatures = signatures;
+    }
+    // Deserialize a SignedNote from a string
+    static fromString(envelope) {
+        if (!envelope.includes(CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR)) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+                message: 'missing checkpoint separator',
+            });
+        }
+        // Split the note into the header and the data portions at the separator
+        const split = envelope.indexOf(CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR);
+        const header = envelope.slice(0, split + 1);
+        const data = envelope.slice(split + CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR.length);
+        // Find all the signature lines in the data portion
+        const matches = data.matchAll(SIGNATURE_REGEX);
+        // Parse each of the matched signature lines into the name and signature.
+        // The first four bytes of the signature are the key hint (should match the
+        // first four bytes of the log ID), and the rest is the signature itself.
+        const signatures = Array.from(matches, (match) => {
+            const [, name, signature] = match;
+            const sigBytes = Buffer.from(signature, 'base64');
+            if (sigBytes.length < 5) {
+                throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                    code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+                    message: 'malformed checkpoint signature',
+                });
+            }
+            return {
+                name,
+                keyHint: sigBytes.subarray(0, 4),
+                signature: sigBytes.subarray(4),
+            };
+        });
+        if (signatures.length === 0) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+                message: 'no signatures found in checkpoint',
+            });
+        }
+        return new SignedNote(header, signatures);
+    }
+}
+// LogCheckpoint represents a transparency log checkpoint. Consists of the
+// following:
+//  - origin: the name of the transparency log
+//  - logSize: the size of the log at the time of the checkpoint
+//  - logHash: the root hash of the log at the time of the checkpoint
+//  - rest: the rest of the checkpoint body, which is a list of log entries
+// See:
+// https://github.com/transparency-dev/formats/blob/main/log/README.md#checkpoint-body
+class LogCheckpoint {
+    constructor(origin, logSize, logHash, rest) {
+        this.origin = origin;
+        this.logSize = logSize;
+        this.logHash = logHash;
+        this.rest = rest;
+    }
+    static fromString(note) {
+        const lines = note.trimEnd().split('\n');
+        if (lines.length < 3) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+                message: 'too few lines in checkpoint header',
+            });
+        }
+        const origin = lines[0];
+        const logSize = BigInt(lines[1]);
+        const rootHash = Buffer.from(lines[2], 'base64');
+        const rest = lines.slice(3);
+        return new LogCheckpoint(origin, logSize, rootHash, rest);
+    }
+}

node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/index.d.ts

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+/// <reference types="node" />
+import { RFC3161Timestamp } from '@sigstore/core';
+import type { TransparencyLogEntry } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+import type { CertAuthority, TLogAuthority } from '../trust';
+export type TimestampType = 'transparency-log' | 'timestamp-authority';
+export type TimestampVerificationResult = {
+    type: TimestampType;
+    logID: Buffer;
+    timestamp: Date;
+};
+export declare function verifyTSATimestamp(timestamp: RFC3161Timestamp, data: Buffer, timestampAuthorities: CertAuthority[]): TimestampVerificationResult;
+export declare function verifyTLogTimestamp(entry: TransparencyLogEntry, tlogAuthorities: TLogAuthority[]): TimestampVerificationResult;

node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/index.js

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+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyTLogTimestamp = exports.verifyTSATimestamp = void 0;
+const error_1 = require("../error");
+const checkpoint_1 = require("./checkpoint");
+const merkle_1 = require("./merkle");
+const set_1 = require("./set");
+const tsa_1 = require("./tsa");
+function verifyTSATimestamp(timestamp, data, timestampAuthorities) {
+    (0, tsa_1.verifyRFC3161Timestamp)(timestamp, data, timestampAuthorities);
+    return {
+        type: 'timestamp-authority',
+        logID: timestamp.signerSerialNumber,
+        timestamp: timestamp.signingTime,
+    };
+}
+exports.verifyTSATimestamp = verifyTSATimestamp;
+function verifyTLogTimestamp(entry, tlogAuthorities) {
+    let inclusionVerified = false;
+    if (isTLogEntryWithInclusionPromise(entry)) {
+        (0, set_1.verifyTLogSET)(entry, tlogAuthorities);
+        inclusionVerified = true;
+    }
+    if (isTLogEntryWithInclusionProof(entry)) {
+        (0, merkle_1.verifyMerkleInclusion)(entry);
+        (0, checkpoint_1.verifyCheckpoint)(entry, tlogAuthorities);
+        inclusionVerified = true;
+    }
+    if (!inclusionVerified) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TLOG_MISSING_INCLUSION_ERROR',
+            message: 'inclusion could not be verified',
+        });
+    }
+    return {
+        type: 'transparency-log',
+        logID: entry.logId.keyId,
+        timestamp: new Date(Number(entry.integratedTime) * 1000),
+    };
+}
+exports.verifyTLogTimestamp = verifyTLogTimestamp;
+function isTLogEntryWithInclusionPromise(entry) {
+    return entry.inclusionPromise !== undefined;
+}
+function isTLogEntryWithInclusionProof(entry) {
+    return entry.inclusionProof !== undefined;
+}

node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/merkle.d.ts

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+import type { TLogEntryWithInclusionProof } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+export declare function verifyMerkleInclusion(entry: TLogEntryWithInclusionProof): void;

node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/merkle.js

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+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyMerkleInclusion = void 0;
+/*
+Copyright 2023 The Sigstore Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+const core_1 = require("@sigstore/core");
+const error_1 = require("../error");
+const RFC6962_LEAF_HASH_PREFIX = Buffer.from([0x00]);
+const RFC6962_NODE_HASH_PREFIX = Buffer.from([0x01]);
+function verifyMerkleInclusion(entry) {
+    const inclusionProof = entry.inclusionProof;
+    const logIndex = BigInt(inclusionProof.logIndex);
+    const treeSize = BigInt(inclusionProof.treeSize);
+    if (logIndex < 0n || logIndex >= treeSize) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+            message: `invalid index: ${logIndex}`,
+        });
+    }
+    // Figure out which subset of hashes corresponds to the inner and border
+    // nodes
+    const { inner, border } = decompInclProof(logIndex, treeSize);
+    if (inclusionProof.hashes.length !== inner + border) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+            message: 'invalid hash count',
+        });
+    }
+    const innerHashes = inclusionProof.hashes.slice(0, inner);
+    const borderHashes = inclusionProof.hashes.slice(inner);
+    // The entry's hash is the leaf hash
+    const leafHash = hashLeaf(entry.canonicalizedBody);
+    // Chain the hashes belonging to the inner and border portions
+    const calculatedHash = chainBorderRight(chainInner(leafHash, innerHashes, logIndex), borderHashes);
+    // Calculated hash should match the root hash in the inclusion proof
+    if (!core_1.crypto.bufferEqual(calculatedHash, inclusionProof.rootHash)) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+            message: 'calculated root hash does not match inclusion proof',
+        });
+    }
+}
+exports.verifyMerkleInclusion = verifyMerkleInclusion;
+// Breaks down inclusion proof for a leaf at the specified index in a tree of
+// the specified size. The split point is where paths to the index leaf and
+// the (size - 1) leaf diverge. Returns lengths of the bottom and upper proof
+// parts.
+function decompInclProof(index, size) {
+    const inner = innerProofSize(index, size);
+    const border = onesCount(index >> BigInt(inner));
+    return { inner, border };
+}
+// Computes a subtree hash for a node on or below the tree's right border.
+// Assumes the provided proof hashes are ordered from lower to higher levels
+// and seed is the initial hash of the node specified by the index.
+function chainInner(seed, hashes, index) {
+    return hashes.reduce((acc, h, i) => {
+        if ((index >> BigInt(i)) & BigInt(1)) {
+            return hashChildren(h, acc);
+        }
+        else {
+            return hashChildren(acc, h);
+        }
+    }, seed);
+}
+// Computes a subtree hash for nodes along the tree's right border.
+function chainBorderRight(seed, hashes) {
+    return hashes.reduce((acc, h) => hashChildren(h, acc), seed);
+}
+function innerProofSize(index, size) {
+    return bitLength(index ^ (size - BigInt(1)));
+}
+// Counts the number of ones in the binary representation of the given number.
+// https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamming_weight
+function onesCount(num) {
+    return num.toString(2).split('1').length - 1;
+}
+// Returns the number of bits necessary to represent an integer in binary.
+function bitLength(n) {
+    if (n === 0n) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return n.toString(2).length;
+}
+// Hashing logic according to RFC6962.
+// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6962#section-2
+function hashChildren(left, right) {
+    return core_1.crypto.hash(RFC6962_NODE_HASH_PREFIX, left, right);
+}
+function hashLeaf(leaf) {
+    return core_1.crypto.hash(RFC6962_LEAF_HASH_PREFIX, leaf);
+}

node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/set.d.ts

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+import { TLogAuthority } from '../trust';
+import type { TLogEntryWithInclusionPromise } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+export declare function verifyTLogSET(entry: TLogEntryWithInclusionPromise, tlogs: TLogAuthority[]): void;

node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/set.js

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+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyTLogSET = void 0;
+/*
+Copyright 2023 The Sigstore Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+const core_1 = require("@sigstore/core");
+const error_1 = require("../error");
+const trust_1 = require("../trust");
+// Verifies the SET for the given entry against the list of trusted
+// transparency logs. Returns true if the SET can be verified against at least
+// one of the trusted logs; otherwise, returns false.
+function verifyTLogSET(entry, tlogs) {
+    // Filter the list of tlog instances to only those which might be able to
+    // verify the SET
+    const validTLogs = (0, trust_1.filterTLogAuthorities)(tlogs, {
+        logID: entry.logId.keyId,
+        targetDate: new Date(Number(entry.integratedTime) * 1000),
+    });
+    // Check to see if we can verify the SET against any of the valid tlogs
+    const verified = validTLogs.some((tlog) => {
+        // Re-create the original Rekor verification payload
+        const payload = toVerificationPayload(entry);
+        // Canonicalize the payload and turn into a buffer for verification
+        const data = Buffer.from(core_1.json.canonicalize(payload), 'utf8');
+        // Extract the SET from the tlog entry
+        const signature = entry.inclusionPromise.signedEntryTimestamp;
+        return core_1.crypto.verify(data, tlog.publicKey, signature);
+    });
+    if (!verified) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROMISE_ERROR',
+            message: 'inclusion promise could not be verified',
+        });
+    }
+}
+exports.verifyTLogSET = verifyTLogSET;
+// Returns a properly formatted "VerificationPayload" for one of the
+// transaction log entires in the given bundle which can be used for SET
+// verification.
+function toVerificationPayload(entry) {
+    const { integratedTime, logIndex, logId, canonicalizedBody } = entry;
+    return {
+        body: canonicalizedBody.toString('base64'),
+        integratedTime: Number(integratedTime),
+        logIndex: Number(logIndex),
+        logID: logId.keyId.toString('hex'),
+    };
+}

node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/tsa.d.ts

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+/// <reference types="node" />
+import { RFC3161Timestamp } from '@sigstore/core';
+import { CertAuthority } from '../trust';
+export declare function verifyRFC3161Timestamp(timestamp: RFC3161Timestamp, data: Buffer, timestampAuthorities: CertAuthority[]): void;

node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/tsa.js

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+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyRFC3161Timestamp = void 0;
+const core_1 = require("@sigstore/core");
+const error_1 = require("../error");
+const certificate_1 = require("../key/certificate");
+const trust_1 = require("../trust");
+function verifyRFC3161Timestamp(timestamp, data, timestampAuthorities) {
+    const signingTime = timestamp.signingTime;
+    // Filter for CAs which were valid at the time of signing
+    timestampAuthorities = (0, trust_1.filterCertAuthorities)(timestampAuthorities, {
+        start: signingTime,
+        end: signingTime,
+    });
+    // Filter for CAs which match serial and issuer embedded in the timestamp
+    timestampAuthorities = filterCAsBySerialAndIssuer(timestampAuthorities, {
+        serialNumber: timestamp.signerSerialNumber,
+        issuer: timestamp.signerIssuer,
+    });
+    // Check that we can verify the timestamp with AT LEAST ONE of the remaining
+    // CAs
+    const verified = timestampAuthorities.some((ca) => {
+        try {
+            verifyTimestampForCA(timestamp, data, ca);
+            return true;
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    });
+    if (!verified) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TIMESTAMP_ERROR',
+            message: 'timestamp could not be verified',
+        });
+    }
+}
+exports.verifyRFC3161Timestamp = verifyRFC3161Timestamp;
+function verifyTimestampForCA(timestamp, data, ca) {
+    const [leaf, ...cas] = ca.certChain;
+    const signingKey = core_1.crypto.createPublicKey(leaf.publicKey);
+    const signingTime = timestamp.signingTime;
+    // Verify the certificate chain for the provided CA
+    try {
+        new certificate_1.CertificateChainVerifier({
+            untrustedCert: leaf,
+            trustedCerts: cas,
+        }).verify();
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TIMESTAMP_ERROR',
+            message: 'invalid certificate chain',
+        });
+    }
+    // Check that all of the CA certs were valid at the time of signing
+    const validAtSigningTime = ca.certChain.every((cert) => cert.validForDate(signingTime));
+    if (!validAtSigningTime) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TIMESTAMP_ERROR',
+            message: 'timestamp was signed with an expired certificate',
+        });
+    }
+    // Check that the signing certificate's key can be used to verify the
+    // timestamp signature.
+    timestamp.verify(data, signingKey);
+}
+// Filters the list of CAs to those which have a leaf signing certificate which
+// matches the given serial number and issuer.
+function filterCAsBySerialAndIssuer(timestampAuthorities, criteria) {
+    return timestampAuthorities.filter((ca) => ca.certChain.length > 0 &&
+        core_1.crypto.bufferEqual(ca.certChain[0].serialNumber, criteria.serialNumber) &&
+        core_1.crypto.bufferEqual(ca.certChain[0].issuer, criteria.issuer));
+}